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euncerned will fix the day anp place for the meeting of the 
commission. 
"III. That the commission shall be at liberty to request as-
sistance and advice from experts in international law and in land, 
naval, and aerial warfare. 
" IV. That the commission shall report its conclusions to each of 
the powers represented in its membership. 
" Those powers shall thereupon confer as to the acceptance of 
t1_1e report and the course to be followed to secure the considera':' 
tion of its recomll?endations by the other civilized powers.' 
The chairman asked whether discussion of the resolution was 
desired. No discussion being desired, the delegations were polled, 
each voted affirmatively, and the chairman announced that the 
resolution had been una~in1ously adopted. 
:Che chairman then asked whether there was any further 
business. 
:\lr. I(ammerer asked whether it would not be advisable to em-
body this resolution in the text of the agreement in regard to sub-
marines and the use of poisonous gases in warf~re. 
l\Ir. Root said he thought lVIr. I(ammerer's suggestion might in-
-rolve a little difficulty in procedure. Under the provisions regard-
ing subn1arines and gas, the adherence of other powers was to be 
immediately requested. He thought that it would be unwise to 
complicate that with this other provision, under which there would 
be no adherence called for until after a report of the commission 
and the acceptance of it by the five powers, after which the -ad-
herence of other powers would be called for. Provisions which 
called for no adherence by other powers would thus be put into 
the treaty, together with provisions which called for immediate 
adherence. 
The chairman said that, if there_ was nothing further to be done 
at the present time, and if agreeable to the committee, adjourn-
ment might be taken. Of course, as soon as the Naval Treaty 
was in readiness, the chairman would call a meeting of the 
committee. 
The cmnmittee then adjourned, subject to the call of the chair. 
TWENTIETH MEETING--TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1922, 3.30 P. M. 
PRESENy. 
United 8tates.-~1r. Hughes, Senator Lodge, 1\11~. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by 1\Ir. 'Vright, :Mr. 
Clark. 
British Bntpire.-Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes,-
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden !for Canada), 
Senator l'earce (for Australia), Sir John· Salmond (for New ZP.-'1-
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land) , l\1r. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by :r:Ir. Christie, l\Ir. 
l\Ialkin, :Mr. l\iousley. 
France.-Mr. Jusserand. Accompanied by l\Ir. Kan1merer, l\le. 
Ponsot. 
Jtaly.-Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Alber-
tini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Aecompanied by Count Pagli-
ano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, l\1r. Bruno Averardi. 
Japan.-Admiral Baron Kato, Baron Shidehara, Mr. Hanihara. 
Accompanied by Capt. Uyeda, l\1r. S_ugimura, Mr. Ichihashi. 
The secretary general. Accompanied by l\Ir. Cresson, l\Ir. 
Pierrepont, l\1r. 'Vilson. l\1r. Camerlynck, interpreter. 
1. The twentieth n1eeting of the Committee on Limitation of 
Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American 
Building on Tuesday, January 31, 1922, at 3.30 p. m. 
2. There \vere present: For the United States, lVlr. Hughes, Se'n-
ator Lodge, lVIr. Root, Senator Underwood, Admiral Coontz; for 
the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New 
Zealand), lHr. Sastri (for India) ; for France, lHr .. Jusserand; 
for Italy, .Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Al-
bertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton; for Japan, Admiral Baron 
Kato, Baron Shidehara, l\1r. Hanihara. 
3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were pres-
ent: ~.,or the United States, Mr. Wright, l\1r. Clark; for the Brit-
ish Empire, lVIr. Christie, Mr. Malkin, Mr. lVlousley; for France, 
Mr. Kamtnerer, l\ir. Ponsot; for Italy, Count Pagliano, Comman-
der Prince Ruspoli, l\fr. Bruno Averardi; for Japan, Capt. Uyeda, 
Mr. Sugimura, l\ir. Ichihashi. 
The secretary general of the conference, assisted by lVIr. Cres-
son, Mr. Pierrepont, · and .l\ir. 'Vilson, was present. l\Ir. Camer-
lynck (interpreter) was also present. 
'.rhe chairman, Mr. Hughes, said l1e was glad to be able to re-
port, from the subcon1mittee of fifteen ·which had had in charge 
the consideration of the proposals relating to the limitation of 
naval armament, that a conclusion had been reached unanimously 
and embodied in a proposed naval treaty. He presented the 
treaty to the committee. It was somewhat long, and he would not 
attempt to read it. He assumed that it had been considered by . 
each delegation, as it had been passed upon by the chiefs of dele-
gations, with thei-r experts, meeting in the subcommittee of fifteen. 
Of course, if it \Va~ desii.·ed by any of the delegates that the treaty 
should be reviewed at this time~ article by article, that course 
would be taken. If he was right in the assumption that each 
:hief of delegation had been over the treaty with his delegation, the 
:hairman assumed that the committee could at once act upon it. 
The action he suggested WfiS that the proposed form of treaty, as 
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passed by the subcomm:ttee of fifteen, which embodied the con-
-elusions reached with respect to the limitation of naval armament, 
be approved and reported to the conference at the plenary session 
-which would be held the following day. The chairman asked if 
that course was agreeable. 
As all delegations assented, the chairman said}t was so ordered. 
l\Ir. Jusserand said: 
'' l\Ir. President, I beg leaYe to submit to the committee a few 
.o.bseryations. I should have liked to have presented them some 
time ago, hut circumstances did not permit. There were other 
questions that came up besides this one of naval disarmament, 
.nnd it was moreover difficult to explain n1yself without getting the 
necessary documents which were not very easy to procure. 
"In the course of the last few weeks the country that I have 
r(~presented in America for nearly 20 years has been censured with 
extreme seYerity, and I might use another word. The letters I 
lwse been receiving, the articles I have read, the conversations in 
-which I haYe taken part, all this shows that a very grave misun-
<.Jc.rstanding is persisting in the minds of many ,as to the ideas of 
France, her faith and her aspirations. Many people continue to 
believe that although we are poor-and we are poor for reasons 
-of which 've are not ashamed-although we are poor, that we 
w·anted to establish a great navy composed of big warships. 
Nothing of the kind. 'Ve are thinking only of the future timP 
when that might be necessary, and when we might become less 
l}liOr, in order that we might resume on the high seas the rank 
,,·hich '\ve have ever held. 
" To which I shall add: Of the countries which we expected to 
approve this ambition, our great maritime neighbor was, in our 
opinion, to be the foremost, since there are so many chances that 
.our fleet may prove of use to Great Britain, and none I think that 
it" should be harmful to her. In the course of the last hundred 
~ears three great wars have taken place in the world in which the 
];ritish and French fleets have participated, and in these three 
·wars they fought side by side for the same cause. Can anything 
different be imagined? We .do not think so, we of France. And 
eYen if our English friends adopted a different opinion, we would 
110t change ours. '\ 
" But the chief blame aimed at us has had for its cause the ques-
tion of the submarines. People continue to be persuaded that we 
h~_:.ve a passion for these loathed machines and want to use them 
German fashion. All this is chiefly grounded on remarks made 
b~· the l11irst Lord of the Admiralty at the sitting of December 30; 
they had an immense effect, still lasting, and were very hurtful to 
:us. They were based on an article by Commander Castex, pub-
lished in January, 1920, which is now famous but was not before, 
.nnd I had trouble to find a copy to read. 
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" I lun·e done so and found that, as for the tone of the article, 
it is_ rather paradoxical. The author passes sweeping judgments 
on n1any 1nen and problen1s, and there are a number of points on 
"\\ hich I disagree with him. He. obviously finds pleasure in upset-
ting commonly prevailing ideas; he generously distribute$ blame 
to many, to the English, to the Germans, to the French. 
"As to the substance o~ the article, its purpose-\vhich could not 
be suspected from the extracts read to this committee-is to show 
the uselessness of privateering- and "guerre de course" under any 
form, unless the country that has recourse to it is in actual posses-
sion of the high seas, through the nun1ber and force of her main 
ships. The author glances at the past, examines the fate of the 
great perturbers of the peace throughout ages, \Vho thought 
they could win through their corsairs. But they lost the game. 
Vlhether they used wood or steel ships, sailing vessels or steam-
ships, surface or sub1narine ----vessels, all under the same delusion, 
lacking a big fleet, they failed. He quotes the example of Louis 
XIV~ of Napoleon the First, of the South in the Civil War, and 
lnstly of the Germans in the great war, concluded by our common 
Ylctory. 
" Such is the purpose of the article. The quotations made 
from it by Lord Lee had for their object, I take it, to prove 
against Commander Castex, and as a consequence against 'oU:r 
naval authorities, not to say against France herself, ·four 
things: v 
"First, that Capt. Castex is in favor of the hated submarine, 
the suppression of \Vhich is demanded by Great Britain from 
motives of humanity. Capt. Castex's belief is, as I have said, 
that the submarine may be useful to those who hold the mastery 
of the seas, an opinion which is not unfavorable to Great Brit-
ain. l-Ie is not, moreover, the only one to think that this device 
must continue to exist. In support of this assertion I beg to 
quote an authority which certainly our British friends "\Viii not 
decline to accept. 
" ' To go to the other extreme, as "\Vas suggested in some quar-
ters. after the armistice, and prohibit submarines altogether, i~ 
an equally. unacceptable proposal. It is clear that, as in the 
case of mines, the weaker naval States would never consent to 
forego the right to employ such a useful defensive "\veapon as the 
submarine. l\1oreover, the idea of submersible \Varships is still 
comparatively new, and· future developments may entirely_ change 
the aspect of this question.. The only reasonable attitude to 
adopt is to insist that such vessels shall be subject to the san1e 
rules of warfare as any other type of "\varship.' 
"This is drawn from the Law of Naval '\Varfare by J. A. Hall, 
lecturer on international law to admirn:ls' secretaries' course, 
Portsmouth, se<:ond edition, London, 1021, p. 77. 
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'' Second, Commander Castex is charged with seeing in the 
submarine a \veapon for 11.,rance-for urigrateful, therefore, and 
perfidious France-to smash the naval power of her present ally 
Great Britain. Lord Lee quoted a paragraph as follows: 
"'Thanks to the submarine, after many centuries of effort, 
thanks to the ingenuity of man, the instrument, the system, the 
martingale is a~ hand which will overthrow for good and all the 
naval power of the British Empire.' 
" Lord Lee then spoke as follows : 
·"'I have quoted this because, as I say, they are the utterances 
of a responsible member of the French naval staff, who at the 
time of writing was in a high position and was the actual head 
of a bureau. 
"'These things are)\:nown to our naval staff of course; indeed 
they were published to the world under the authority of the 
French naval staff.' 
"The \Vords 'will o\erthrow for good and all the naval power 
of the British Empire,' are not the words of a Frenchman! nor 
words that any Frenchman would approve. The quotation as 
given by Lord Lee began by three words indispensable for the 
understanding of the whole, which he did not incl!Jde. They 
were : ' This is the way the Germans are reasoning.' Con1mander 
Castex was citing the point of view of the Germans, not the 
point of view of the French. The mistake is the more difficult 
to understand since not once but twice Commander Castex took 
the saine precaution, saying on the preceding page: , ' For our 
enem~es these ships did represent; or a,t least they thought so, the 
new engine, the technical and material upsetting that was going 
to make every old teaching obsolete.' 
"l\Iore than that, the very title of the article leaves no doubt 
as to its purport. In its complete form, which had not been 
quoted, it reads, ' Synthesis of submarine warfare-Character-
istics of the German submarine warfare.' If, therefore, on ac-
count of those lines of Commander Castex cause for anxiety is 
found about something, it must be about the German enemies and 
not the French friends of Great Britain. 
" Third, Commander Castex has been represented as approving 
of the infamous use made of submarines by Germany. All 
should be at a loss to understand how this claim could have been 
made, since the French officer expressed himself formally, clearly, 
and peremptorily in the opposite sense. After having said that 
the Germans could not be blamed simply because. they used the. 
submarine, he adds : ' The only reproach that can be set up 
against them is to have too frequently and in too many particular 
cases smeared their flag by conducting submarine warfare with 
harbarity and with an aggravation of odious acts. A useless 
lind, moreove1·, a stupid cruelty, for it served in no way the pur-
242 CON DElVIN ATION OF GER}}fAN 'V AR. 
pose of the war, and because in the end it turned against their 
own interest by raising against then1 the unanimous condemna-
tion of the consc·ence of the civilized people of the world.' 
''Am I not entitled to maintain not only that Con1mander Cas-
tex was not approving of these Gern1an ways and means but that 
te expressly condemned thern? 
" Comn1ander Castex was also stated by Lord Lee to have made 
his own the views of Admiral Au be (a man of wild theories, whom 
I have well known, who, desiring the end of all wars, fancied 
that the ruthless use of torpedo boats would bring that to pass), 
but Con1n1ander Castex did not approve those views, he just 
blamed them, a d:fference worth noting. 
"Fourth, it has also been said that Commander Castex was 
probably teaching in the French naval schools the theories thus 
attributed to him; and it has been said in such unkind and cruel 
words that my heart is still bleeding at the thought of them. 
Those '"'words were as follows : 
" 'Now, this officer, who is appo:nted principal lecturer to the 
.Een:or officers' course, will, no doubt, unless a change of policy 
takes place, be pouring what we regard as this infamy and this 
:poison into the ears of the serving officers of the French navy.' 
"The answer to ~this," lVIr. Jusserand continued, "is twofold 
and simple enough. There is no need for us to change our policy. 
Commander Castex can not teach ·what has been called that 
infamy, first, because he detests it; second, because his· course of 
lectures has nothing to do with submarines, his subject being the 
-organization of the general staff. 
"The subject ... -is 'SO -grave that I want to let you know: what is 
.actually taught in French naval schools as to the submarine and 
the German way of using it. The following extract will enlighten 
you: 
" 'The submarine weapon has turned round against the raving 
maniacs who employed it and Germany's misfortune came not 
only from the defeat of her land armies, but in a very large 
measure from the incomprehension of those who, in her camp, 
have ordered it. ; 
" 'The privateers' war is forbidden in the form which has been 
given it by the Germans. That the Germans may have consid-
·ered the most solemn engagements as scraps of paper. is their 
business. But it does not behoove Frenchmen to follow such 
shameful examples. The life of human societies, like that of 
men, rests on good faith, and the French have too often shown 
other people how loyal one should be to give up now, under the 
effect of surprise caused by the submarine \var, give up what has 
been their glory in the past and may be again, I am persuaded, 
their force in the future.' 
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"It has been said," continueu l\1r. Jusserand, "that the article 
of Commander Castex was well known to the British naval staff. 
l\lay I express regret that such lessons as are being given by 
Capt. Laurent, the author of the passage I have just quoted, 
a:Hl the subject of whose lectures is naval strategy, have appar-
ently remained unknown to the same staff. The lesson I quoted 
caD not be supposeu to have had anything to do with the present 
discussion, for it was taught on June 1, 1920, and appears in 
Commander Laurent's printed text, volume II, page 107. 
"In conclusion, I believe I am justified in saying that neither 
the infamy wrongly ascribed to Commander Castex nor any 
other is taught or ever shall be taught in any of those French 
naYal schools from whence con1e the comrades of war that have 
fallen of late by the side of American and British officers and 
those of the other allied nations; nothing of the kind has ever 
teen taught and never shall be. 
" I beg to add one word. In the session of the 23d of December 
the chief of the British delegation-to whom I am bound by a 
friendship so ancient that since we began to know each other 
people were born who. had time to grow up and' cover themselves 
vvith glory in the course of the last war-mentioned that Great 
Britain alone was sufficiently equipped to combat submarine war-
fare, thanks to her gallant coast population, her fishermen, so 
expert in everything that concerns life at sea; and he said that 
Great Britain had used 3,676 submarine chasers, to the immense 
advantage of France, who had only 257, and that should the 
necessity eYer again arise Great Britain would ha.ve to protect 
France again. On this point I collected information and found 
that at the beginning of the war all who could bear a rifle were 
sent to the front, and a good many of our sailors and fisher-
men are now sleeping their last sleep, not in the sea or along the 
coast, but in the trenches, facing north or east, facing Belg~um 
and .AJsace. 
"'Vhen the pitiless submarine war was started by Germany we 
set to work and did our best to meet this new danger, helping 
ourselves and the common cause. We are still filled with admira-
tion for England's sailors. All the world knows of our feelings 
for those gallant and heroic men at home, on the sea; a model of 
all nations. From common testimony, however, our population 
also, our Bretons and Normans, Gascons and Provencals did 
creditably, and they manned in 'the perilous waters of western or 
southern Europe not 257 ships but over 1,300. 
" Our British friends, who live in a country of fair play while 
we live in the country of 'franc jeu,' will not find it amiss if 
I have found it necessary to present these few remarks. It is 
because we attach so much value to the friendship and considera-
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tion of the great people that the British are that I have thought 
these rectifications indispensable." 
Lord Lee said he was not a·ware that the matter just discussed 
was to be raised at that time, and therefore he was not in a 
position to reply in the detailed ·way which might have been possi-
ble if he had had with him the. relevant papers or the actual 
articles to which lHr. Jusserand had referred. In any case, he 
did not think it would be necessary, in what he had to say, to 
take up point .bY point the various criticisms which 1\:Ir. Jusserand 
was good enough to make of his previous speech, and which Lord 
Lee took, if he might say so entirely in good part. He regarded 
l\fr. Jusserand, of course, as fully justified in putting forward the 
opposite view. Still less had Lord Lee any desire to resurrect a 
controversy which could i_n any way impair the good relations 
which existed and which he hoped would always exist between 
their two countries. 
He had to confess, however, that he was a little ~urprised at 
what seemed to him the whole-hearted and almost vehement 
defense which l\1r. Jusserand had undertaken of the article ·which 
had been written by Commander Castex. It was true that Mr. 
Jusserand had said, at the comp1encement of his remarks, that 
there were certain passages with which he did not agree, but 
Lord Lee thought l\1r. Jusserand would also adn1it that the 
burden of his speech that afternoon had been substantially a 
defense of the theories and the attitudes taken up by Capt. 
Castex in his article. He did not know ·whether his eolleagues 
had all had ·a'n opportunity to read the article as a whole, but 
·whatever might be the opinion with regard to this or that indi-
vidual passage-and he would come to that in a n1o1nent-there 
could be no question whatsoever that the main thesis of the artic'le, 
that its main purpose was, in the first place, to point out that 
the characteristics of Gern1an sub1narine warfare, that is to say,. 
" unlimited submarine warfare," \Vere inevitable in the circum-
stances of the late war and that the critics who denounced them 
were real1y taking up an unreasonable and almost absurd posi-
tion. Capt. Castex ridiculed the objections to these methods <?f 
warfare, and even werit so far as to claim that they had origi-
nated on the French side of the Rhine, like, ~s he said, so many 
other good ideas which the Germans had adopted. That vvas the 
general tone and the whole tenor of the article. 
He could not believe, although his knowledge of :r·rench ~atu­
r ally did not equal that of M. Jusserand's, that there was any 
other possible interpretation of t.he whole spirit of the article, 
however full it n1ight be of varadoxical observations. He sug-
gested tlw.t it was a Vt}t•y dan.gerous thing to indulge quite so 
libei·ally in varadoxes on su~h a subject as this distinguished 
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naval authority appeared to have done. It led to ambiguities and 
to misunderstandings, possibly of a very serious character. 
His main point wns-and he was prepared, of course, if he l1a<l 
misrepresented any particular passage or the bearing of any par-
ticular passage-to withdraw any observation that he might have 
made u110n it; but he did not withdraw for one moment the gen-
eral feeling of condemnation and horror which be thought anyone 
reading the article as a whole must have felt for the views which 
Capt. Castex there expressed ... and championed. He was glad to 
see, moreover, that they were condemned by no one in more vigor-
ous terms than by Capt. Castex's brother officer, Admiral de Bon, 
who described them as "monstrosities "-that was his phrase, if 
he recalled it aright; ai.1d it was a!'most as promptly, at any rate 
on the first opportunity, repudiated in the most formal manner 
by l\1. Sarraut, speaking on behalf of the French Government. It 
was, therefore, expressly condemned in the first place by the great 
s~rvice to which Capt. Castex belonged, a~d secondly, by the ac-
credited representative of the French Government. 
Directly that was done, Lord Lee took the ,first opportunity, 
here in this room, of accepting, in the 1nost whole-hearted way, the 
repudiation by the French Government of the article and the senti-
me:l,ts contained in it. He further expressed the hope that the 
incident would be regarded as satisfactorily closed; and was so 
given to understand in the reply which M. Sarraut was good 
enough to make on that occasion. 
Xot having the article here, and not knowing the subject was 
coming up this afternoon, Lord Lee was not in a position to 
analyze the 11articular passages ·which M. Jusserand had just 
quoted, but his own view was that although some of them may 
possibly have been conceived in the spirit of paradox, they are 
also ambiguous, and that whatever might be M. Jusserand's view 
of them,· from reading the article, Lord Lee could not conceive any 
doubt whatsoever as to what was in the mind of Capt. Castex, 
' and that was that he was a whole-hearted supporter of the neces-
sity of the German system of unlimited submarine warfare, \vhich 
had been stigmatized as piracy by this conference in the formal 
resolutions proposed by l\:Ir. Root. 
:\I. .Jusserand made it a further cause of offense that be, Lord 
Lee, suggested that Capt. Castex might be teaching these views to 
the officers' course, of which he has been appointed a principal 
lecturer. 'Veil, if an officer held views of that character, which 
Capt. Castex thought of sufficient importance, and which were 
deemed of sufficient importance to be published in the represen-
tative service technical publication "under the authority of the 
general staff "-although they were careful in all such cases to 
say they did not necessarily take responsibility for what was 
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said-it \Vas a fair assumption that, holding those views, and hav-
ing expressed them so prominently, Capt. Castex should continue 
to expound them to the officers to whom he lectured in the course 
of his duty. Lord Lee was very glad to know that such was not 
to be the case, as it obviously could not now be the case, in view 
of both the professional and the political repudiation of those 
views by the Government under which Capt. Castex served. 
He said that M. Jusserand had then spoken of another matter. 
He had talked of the part that France had played in the late war 
on the seas. No one who had not, like Lord Lee, had the honor of 
representing the British Admiralty, could know what a great part 
France had played, to the utmost limit of her ability. Nothing, 
the speaker said, was further from his intention, or that of Mr .. 
Dalfour, than to suggest the smallest reproach of France for not 
having been able, with all her other obligations, to put forth a 
greater effort for the suppression of the submarine. All knew she 
did her utmost. But this must be said in regard to the late con-
troversy on the submarine: The situation of the late war might 
occur again in years to come. In that war practically the whole 
burden of dealing with the submarine menace which had affected 
France, as it had affected Great Britain, was thrown upon the 
latter power. He remembered Admiral de Bon saying that no one 
could recall without profound emotion· the sacrifices, burdens, and 
anxieties that were thrown upon Great Britain as the result of 
that submarine campaign. In these circumstances, and knowing 
how nearly that campaign had succeeded, he must remind France 
that Great Britain might not be in a position to do it again, 
and to put forth another effort sufficient to defend both France 
and herself. He had therefore ventured to urge, in the interest of 
both their countries, that submarines should be suppressed al-
together, because without that suppression that perilous situation 
might recur. • 
That was the main, and the stated, reason for the desire of the 
British to abolish submarines, and that was why the British Em-
pire delegati&n regretted so deeply that France, knowing all the 
circumstances, should have refused their request and should have 
insisted upon forcing this in tolerable burden upon them in a 
future war, if the circumstances should recur. 
Lord Lee did not want to embark upon what might be con-
sidered a controvers~onal reply to l\1. Jusserand about France's 
desire not to increase her naval armaments. He knew nothing 
of the desire or motives of France in tliat matter. All the British 
Empire delegation said was that as a matter of fact France was 
p_roposing to treble her existing fleet of submarines. They ob-
jected strongly to that, and they had stated their objections, 
and they did not wish, on this occasion, to enlarge upon them 
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again. rr~lley, on the other hand, desired in every way to limit 
armament. They had reduced tl1eir own navy drastically, at this 
eonference, and had gone further, since the commencement of the 
conference, to show their good will and their desire to assist 
France and to relieve her from these unnecessary burdens. They 
had offered ller a guarantee by the whole of their armed forces 
by ·land, sea, and air, to protect her against any aggression on her 
coasts. They had done everything that was possible in that way 
to s~ww their good will and good faith, and they had desired in 
all these matters to wo1·1{ with and to assist France. Therefore, 
lle would say as a final word, and with an apology to his col-
leagues for having detained them so long, that he des~red from the 
depths of his heart to see not only maintained but improved the 
good relations that existed between Great Britain and her great 
neighbor across the Channel, and it was the desire of his country, 
and certainly his own desire, that no word should be said that 
could in any way impair that good feeling. He hoped, just as 
his French friends and Allies. hoped, that Great Britain and 
France should go forward together in these matters, not only 
as friends and Allies, but hand in hand for the 'reconstruction of 
Europe and civili~ation. 
l\1r. Jusserand said " I shall say only on(~ word. I note ·with 
profound satisfaction the last remark made by the First Lord of 
the Admiralty. 'Vith that I agree from my heart and I may 
assure him that all my compatriots will. But I can not admit 
the statement that if the submarine be preserved it is owing to 
France; one more of those many unpleasant things reported as. 
having been caused by France, when such is not the case. As a 
matter of fact the vote against the British proposal was unani-
mous, including the United States, both through their delegation 
and their unanimous advisory committee. Lord Lee has again 
spoken of our intention of building a large number of submarines. 
"\\'~' e shall in reality b~ild them or not in accordance with our 
needs and our means. That Commander Castex really condemned 
the submarine, German fashion, I can not better prove than by 
reading again the passage quoted a moment ago." 
Lord Lee interrupted to say: "I only say he cited those special 
occasions as· having spoiled the German case, which he otherwise 
thought was a good one." 
l\lr. Jusserand then remarked " I don't understand it that 
\Vay," and continued with his speech: 
"'Vhat I said of the paradoxical disposition of Commander 
Castex referred chiefly to his sweeping historical remarks, like 
those on ' perturbers ' being represented as always mystical. 1 do 
not belieYe Napoleon was, nor Julius Caesar. As for the con-
demnation of Commander Castex by l\1r. Sari·aut and Admiral 
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de Bon, both condemned what was unexpectedly quoted of him, 
n'either knowfng then the real text. But I do not desire to insist . 
. \Vith Lord Lee, I am ready to leave the question to the judgment 
of our colleagues when they have a chance of reading the whole 
article under discussion. Allow me to close by repeating that, 
of the words uttered . in this controversy, the last pronounced 
by Lord Lee are the ones which I chiefly want to remember." 
The chairman called attention to the fact that there was still 
one matter which, perhaps, might be passed upon that afternoon. 
He brought this before the committee, knowing the general 
desire to conclude its work and hoping to assist, if possible, in 
attaining that end. This was a draft of a proposed treaty which 
embodied the resolutions previously adopted with respect to sub-
nlarines and poison gas. He understood that the French text 
had received the approval of 1\tlr. I(ammerer of the French delega-
tion. 
Inasmuch as this treaty contained nothing new, the substantive 
matte~ being the resolutions which had been adopted and the 
formal matters being conventional, he would, with the committee's 
consent, read it. If the committee should desire to take it under 
further consideration, that would be done. If not, perhaps the 
committee would authorize its presentation at the plenary session 
the fol~owirig day. 
The chairman then read the draft treaty, as follows: 
" The United States of America, , the British Empire, France, 
Italy, and Japan, hereinafter referred to as signatory powers, 
desiring to make more effectively the rules adopted by civilized 
nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncom-
batants at sea in time of war, and to prevent the use in war of 
noxious gases and chemicals, have determined to ·conclude a 
treaty to this effect, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries 
(and so forth). 
"Who, having communicated their full po\vers, found in good 
and clue fonn, have agreed as follows: 
"I. 
"The signatory po\vers declare that among the rules adopted by 
civilized nations for the· protection of the lives of neutrals and 
noncombatants at sea in time of war, the following are to be 
deerned an established part of international law.: 
"(1) A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and 
search to determine its character before it can be seized. 
"A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to 
submit to visit and search after warning, or to vroceed as directed 
after seizure. 
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"A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and 
passengers have been first placed in safety. 
"(2) Belligerent submarines are not under any 4f"Circumstances 
exempt from the universal rules above stated; and if a submarine 
can not capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules 
the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and 
from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed 
unmolested. 
" II. 
"The signatory powers invite all other civilized powers to 
·express their assent to the foregoing statement of established law 
so that there may be a clear public understanding throughout the 
world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion of 
the W«?rld is to pass judgment upon future belligerents. 
"III. 
"The signatory po\vers, desiring to insure the enforcement of 
the humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect to 
attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant ships, 
further declare that any person in the service of any power who 
shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is 
under orders .of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have 
violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punish-
ment as if for an act of piracy and may be brought to trial before 
the civil or military authorities of any power within the jurisdic-
tion of which he may be found. 
"IV. 
" The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as con1merce destroyerf? without violating, as 
they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918, the require-
ments universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection 
of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that 
the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers 
shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations they 
no\v accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between 
themselves and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto. 
"v. 
" The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, 
and all analogous liqu:ds, materials, or devices, having been justly 
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a 
prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which 
: t majority of the civil:zed powers are parties, 
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" The signatory po,vers, to the end that this prohibition shall 
be universally accepted as a part of international law, binding 
alike the con~cience and 'practice of nations, declare their assent 
to such prohibition, agree to be bound ·thereby as between them-
selves, and invite all otlYer civilized nations to 'adhere thereto. 
"VI. 
"The present treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in ac-
cordance with the constitutional methods of the signatory powers 
and shall take effect on the deposit of all the ratifications, 'vhich 
shall take ·place at 'Vashington. 
" The Government of the United States of America ·will trans-
mit to- all the signatory po,vers a certified copy of the proces-
Yerbal of the deposit of ratifications. 
"The present treaty, in Fr<;nch and in English, shall ren1ain 
deposited in the archives of the GoYernment of the United States 
of America, and duly certified copies thereof vv;ll be transmitted 
by that Government to each of the signatory powers. 
"VII. 
" The Government of the United States of A1nerica will further 
transmit to each of the nonsignatory powers a duly certified copy 
of the present tre~ty and invite its adherence :thereto. 
"Any nonsignatory ppwer 1nay adhere to the present treaty by 
communicating an instrun1ent of adherence to the Government of 
the United States of America, which will thereupon transmit to 
each of the signatory and adhering powers a certified copy of 
each instrument of adherence. 
" In faith whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present treaty. 
"Done at the city of Washington the day of February, 
1922." 
The chairman stated that this vvas not presented for discussion 
at this time. It had been drawn by 1\fr. Root, and the chairman 
understood that it follo,ved the text of the resolutions precisely, 
except in conventional matters, such as the introduction and con-
clusion. ff any delegates desired this to be held over," it would 
be held over. If, however, the committee was ready to have it 
go in in that form, it would be presented at the next plenary ses-
sion and that much more would be out of the way. 
He asked the pleasure of the committee. 
Mr. Balfour said that he 'vas much embarrassed about this. 
He agreed, of course, to the substance of all the chairman had 
read. There 'vas a question, however, that he would like to ask 
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l\lr. Root He asked if that would be in order and was assured 
that it ·would. 
Continuing, l\ir. Balfour said the question had been raised that 
morning at a meeting of the British delegation, and the point 
vvas this: The proposed treaty seemed to be perfectly clear and 
satisfactory as between the powers represented at this table. 
The difficulty was as follows : He· was afraid it was very easy to 
conceiYe a case in ·which, for instance, one of the five powers 
represented around this table might be at war with another 
signatory po·wer having as an ally some nation not agreeing to 
the treaty. An ambiguous and difficult situation would result. 
He ·would like l\ir. Root's opinion upon a. point which seemed, 
at least to some of his friends, not to be without difficulty and 
embarrassment. '.rhe apparent difficulty would ·be almost un-
thinkable. It would mean one of these countries represented at 
this table being at war ·with another power at the table, who 
had an ally not represented at the table. He did not mean to 
press the matter, but he was given to understand that that was a 
point that was in the minds of many. He did not think it haa 
receiYed much consideration, and as the treaty would have to run 
the gauntlet of many severe criticisms, like other treaties, he 
\vould like to know what M_r. Root's advice on the point was. 
l\lr. Root said he thought that was one of the things which it 
·was quite impossible to provide for in the treaty. No agreen1ent 
could be made in the application of which questions would not 
arise in the future. If the n1embers of the committee were to 
try to guard against all conceivable situations to which this 
agreement between them was to be applied, they would make a 
treaty as long as the moral law. Now, they were making this 
treaty between then1selYes and they must assume that it would 
be carried out in good faith. If another power that was not 
bound by the treaty should come ·along and create a situation 
to which the treaty did not apply, then it would not apply; but 
that would have to be determin~d by the conditions and the facts 
as they arose. He could not believe that there would be any 
real embarrassment. 
l\1r. Balfour said that he would not press the 1natter. 
Senator Schanzer stated that the Italian delegation shared the 
anxleties to which l\fr. Balfour referred, and he thought that he 
had raised very opportunely the question concerning the execu-
tion of the treaty in the case of war with a power which had 
neith~r signed nor adhered to the treaty itself. If one of the five 
great signatory powers should find itself in war with another 
of the five signatory powers and the latter should be allied with a 
nonsignatory or nonadherent power, it was clear that the first-
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n1entioned power could not afford to find itself bound by the 
dut:es imposed by the treaty. In effect, the nonsignatory or non-
adherent powers 'vould be free to make unlimited use of sub-
marines, poisonous gases, etc., and would do it not ·only in its 
own interest, but also in the interest of the great po,vers to which -
it was allied. He wished to repeat that in these conditions it was 
~lear that the execution of the provisions of the treaty would 
~ease to be effective. He could agree with Mr. Root that it was 
not absolutely indispensable to provide for this case by a special 
stipulation in · the treaty, but it was nevertheless desirable that 
the interpretation given to-day should be registered in the min-
utes of the committee. 
The chairman stated that what had been said would be re-
corded in the minutes. He asked if the committee was ready to 
act upon the treaty and to accept it for submission at the next 
-plenary session. All assented, and he declared further that the 
treaty was accepted and that course would be taken. 
He then asked if the committee would consent to adjourn, so 
that a n1eeting of the Far Eastern committee might be held. 
Sir John Sahnond said he would like to raise one question 
before adjournment; that was whether these two treaties were 
to be given any distinguishing title or name by the committee. 
·There were to be a number of treaties, and there ought to be 
some method of referring to them in public and of distinguish-
ing them. 
The chairman said that had been considered and it was thought 
inadvisable to put in the treaty anything li~e a popular name; 
but the treaties would be given nam_es by the public just the 
same. Of course, already there was the name " The Four Power 
Treaty." 'I'here was the preamble which expressed the purpose 
of the treaty, to reduce the burdens of competition in naval 
:armament. Of course, there would be the naval armmnent treaty 
and then tbe submarine treaty, as he supposed it would popularly 
be called. In other words, while it might not be just the thing 
for the committee to c1esignate the treaties by any popular name, 
some appropriate rlame for them would undoubtedly be adopted. 
He suggested that the committee might leave it to the public 
to name them. 
Sir John Salmond thought the comn1ittee should not leave it 
to the public to nan1e the treaties, but should name them itself, 
.and asked if there was any objection to adding a subclause giving 
them a recognized name, or to clTecting the same purpose by a 
resolution of the committee, that this should be known as so-
:and-so; for instance, the "Naval Treaty of \Vashington," and the 
second treaty as the "Declaration of Washington," not as the 
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submarine treaty, but as the "Declaration of Washington," cor-
responding to the Declaration of Paris or the Declaration of 
London. In the same way the treaty with respect to the Pacific 
might be appropriately termed the \Vashington-Pacifie treaty 
rather than the four power treaty or the four power pact, or 
some other popular name or misnomer that the newspapers might 
choose. He _suggested that the committee itself ought to take 
the responsibility of naming and christening its work. 
The chairman said that to bring this to a point-and he did 
not desire to be considered as hurr~ring the committee, but he 
was under obligation to release eertain delegates as soon as possi-
ble-he would assume that Sir John Salmond had moved that the 
first treaty be regarded as the "Naval Treaty of \Vashington," 
and asked if the committee was ready to act upon it. 
Senator Schanzer stated that he did not agree with Sir John 
Salmond's view that it was a tradition to give a name to a treaty, 
but that a treaty was na1ned by the place, the date, and the 
parties that took part. It seemeu to him there was no necessity 
for christening the1n, or at least it was not done ip. other countries. 
The chairman said he understood that the Italian delegation 
voted "No" on the proposal of Sir John Salmon. (Senator Schan-
zer indicated that the chairman's understanding was correct.) 
This was a tribunal-and he had in mind a legal friend who, he 
kne\v, would like to be a member of such a tribunal-where the 
dissenting opinion was the prevailing opinion. He declared the 
motion lost. He added that whether the committee resolved or 
did not resolve, these treaties would be named, and all the mem-
bers of the committee could do, in his opinion, was to be as good 
prophets as possible in trying to hit the names that the public 
would adopt. 
The committee then adjourned subject to the call of the Chair, 
and the chairman asked the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern 
Questions to assemble. 
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